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CIVIL RIGHTS
STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL GRANTS TO NEARBY TOWN
Evans v. Lynn
Federal courts have recently exhibited an increased willingness
to broaden the categories of persons qualified to bring suit in
housing and urban development cases.' Consequently, standing in
such actions is no longer restricted to direct victims of discrimina-
tory action.2 The relaxation of standing barriers with respect to
those seeking judicial review of agency action, and in particular the
review of an agency's failure to perform its statutory duties, can be
identified as a parallel trend.3 Serving to give these developments
added impetus, the Second Circuit, in Evans v. Lynn, 4 held that
ghetto residents questioning grants made to a nearby town have
standing to challenge the alleged "inaction" of federal agencies in
failing to perform their statutory duties under the Civil Rights Acts
of 19645 and 1968.6
'See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (residents of
housing unit, although not direct victims of discrimination, have standing under Civil Rights
Act of 1968 to challenge landlord's discriminatory practices); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d
809 (3d Cir. 1970) (residents of urban renewal area have standing under Housing Act of
1949 and Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 to challenged HUD action maintaining the low
income character of the area); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937
(2d Cir. 1968) (association may be given standing if necessary to protect constitutional rights
of persons "not immediately before the court").
2 In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the
Court extended standing to white persons who allegedly suffered the loss of the benefits of
interracial association when blacks were excluded from their apartment complex. Similarly,
in Topic v. Circle Realty Co. 377 F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (mem.), residents of
a community of over 100,000 persons were held to have standing to challenge the "racial
steering" practices of local realtors who were directing nonwhite purchasers into minority
residential areas. Although none of the plaintiffs had been so "steered," the court found
that, as residents of a segregated community, they were sufficiently affected. For a discussion
of residence in a community as a basis for standing, see note 19 infra.3 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam). See generally
Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Tucker].
4 Civil No. 74-1793 (2d Cir., June 2, 1975), rev'g and remanding in part and aff'g in part
376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). In Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d et seq. (1970), it is established that
[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or' national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance.
Id. § 2000d. In particular, federal agencies empowered to grant federal aid are directed to
effectuate this basic policy and may do so
(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program ... to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding.., of a
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:303
Defendants, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) and the Board of Outdoor Recreation (BOR),
awarded the Town of New Castle monetary grants to be used for
the construction of sewers and the creation of a park and wildlife
preserve in nearby Turner Swamp.7 The Town is a predominantly
white, high income suburban community, 90 percent zoned for
single-family homes. Plaintiffs, low income minority residents of
the county, sought to challenge the grants on the ground that
defendants had failed to perform their Civil Rights Acts duties to
affirmatively effectuate national antidiscrimination and fair housing
policies.8
Plaintiffs alleged that HUD and BOR had approved the grants
in question without properly evaluating the character of the recip-
ient Town in terms of its fair housing policies. 9 Such inaction, it
was claimed, was evidence of the specific and nationwide neglect by
HUD and BOR of their obligations under the affirmative duty
provisions of the Civil Rights Acts. 10 Plaintiffs further contended that,
as nearby ghetto residents, they were within the zone of statutorily
protected interests and that by reason of defendants' inaction,
failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be
limited to the particular political entity . . . as to whom such a finding has been
made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in
which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized
by law....
Id. § 2000d-1.
6 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974), declares it to be "the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601
(1970). Title VIII further provides:
All executive departments and agencies shall administer their programs and ac-
tivities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the purposes of this subchapter....
Id. § 3608(c).
I Civil No. 74-1793 at 3888. The court acknowledged that the grants for a sewer system
and recreational area were arguably outside the statutes' purview since they might not be
considered related to housing and urban development. It was also noted, however, that both
HUD and BOR had characterized the grants as so related and that such administrative
interpretations were entitled to great weight. Id. at 3893 n.10, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965). For the dissent's opinion on this point, see note 35 infra.
8 See notes 5-6 supra.
In January of 1973, when interested parties filed an informal letter of complaint with
HUD concerning the grants, they'were informed that no rating sheet for the project was on
file. A "reconstructed" rating sheet assessing the character of the community and the need
for funding was thereafter assembled. There was, however, some evidence that the recon-
structed rating sheet did not accurately portray either the policies or the financial situation
of New Castle. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 12-14.
10 Id. at 25. Since it would entail inquiry beyond the question of standing, no determina-
tion was made by the Evans court as to the extent of the statutory duty to promote fair
housing. Interestingly, however, in Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974),
it was pointed out that there is no duty incumbent upon federal agencies to construct low
income housing.
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which permitted the maintenance of segregated housing patterns
within the county, they suffered injury in fact.'1
HUD moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs cross-moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit dis-
bursement of the grants in question, and the Town of New Castle
was granted leave to intervene.12 The district court denied the
request for a preliminary injunction and granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 13 More
specifically, District Judge Pollack found that, having failed to dem-
onstrate that they would suffer injury in fact as a result of the
grants, plaintiffs had no personal stake in the outcome.' 4
A divided Second Circuit panel, holding that plaintiffs had
satisfied the two-pronged test for standing established by the Su-
preme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 15 reversed and remanded the decision of the district court
for further proceedings. 16 The Data Processing test requires that
plaintiffs allege "injury in fact" as a result of the challenged action
and that the interest they seek to defend be "arguably within the
zone of interests" intended to be protected by the statute in ques-
tion.1 7
Judge Oakes, who authored the court's opinion, initially noted
three factual assumptions made by the district court.' 8 First, the
appellants were minority ghetto residents of Westchester County. 9
11 Civil No. 74-1793 at 3888.
"See id. at 3905 (Moore, J., dissenting).
13 376 F. Supp. at 334.
14 Id. at 332. Although Judge Pollack acknowledged that ghetto living conditions are a
"very real and very serious 'injury,'" he found that there was no "link" between the injury
and the challenged action. In his opinion, these plaintiffs would not be affected by continua-
tion or termination of the New Castle grants. He further noted that the plaintiffs' status as
"potential residents" did not aid their position since it would not give them the necessary
"'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.'" Id., citing Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d
1187 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Is 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
"6 Civil No. 74-1793 at 3901. The court affirmed the decision below as to a third
defendant, Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (Tri-State). Tri-State is an interstate
agency established by New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut and designated by the Office
of Management and Budget to serve as "areawide clearinghouse for review of applications
for federal aid to assure conformance with regional comprehensive plans." Id. at 3900.
Tri-State had refused to evaluate the impact of the grants on the ground that they lacked
regional significance. It is submitted that a contrary approach would have been unduly
burdensome since it would be unreasonable to expect a large multistate review board to
expend its limited resources to comment on the civil rights aspect of local problems of
limited scope.
17 397 U.S. at 152-53.
Is Civil No. 74-1793 at 3889-92.
'9 That plaintiffs were residents of the county in which New Castle is located is sig-
nificant in light of prior decisions pursuant to which members of a community affected by
1975]
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Second, the Town for which the grants were authorized was not
only 98.7 percent white and zoned for single-family residences of
more than 1 acre, but was also characterized by a history of opposi-
tion toward attempts to alter the exclusive nature of the commu-
nity. 20 Third, the defendants' evaluation of New Castle's develop-
ment policies reflected little if any attempt on their part to perform
the affirmative duties allegedly required under the Acts.21 It is
within this factual context that the Data Processing test was applied.
Whether or not the plaintiffs' asserted interests are within the
zone of statutory protection, Judge Oakes reasoned, depends upon
whether a "viable" claim is presented that the federal agencies are
charged with affirmative duties requiring them to take some action,
not taken in this instance, on the plaintiffs' behalf.2 2 In his opinion,
the scope and purpose of the relevant legislation,23 the express
language of the Acts, 24 and the case law construing these provi-
sions,25 supported such a claim. Generally, courts have found legis-
lative history of little help in determining questions of standing
under the Civil Rights Acts. 26 The Evans court, however, gained
considerable insight from remarks by Senator Mondale and other
sponsors of those portions of the Civil Rights Acts which contain
the affirmative duty provisions. 27 Indicating that the purpose of
discriminatory or allegedly illegal agency action have been given standing to challenge such
action. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Brookhaven Housing
Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Indeed, in Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized that individual
acts of discrimination may affect an entire community. And, somewhat similarly, in South
East Chicago Comm'n v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 62, 67 (N.D. Il1. 1972), affid, 488 F.2d 1119 (7th
Cir. 1973), the court strongly implied that residents of one neighborhood could challenge
agency action affecting another part of the city in which they reside. What may be involved
in these decisions, including Evans, which recognized the plaintiffs' right to bring suit as
"nearby" ghetto residents, is an expansion of the concept of community for purposes of
standing.
20 New Castle was among several other Westchester communities which had successfully
thwarted attempts by the New York State Urban Development Corporation to construct low
income housing within their towns. Civil No. 74-1793 at 3890 n.7.
21 Id. at 3891; see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
22 Civil No. 74-1793 at 3892.
23See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
24 Some of the Acts' more relevant provisions are quoted in notes 5-6supra. Judge Oakes
viewed the establishment of an affirmative duty, pursuant to which the federal agencies
would be required to act, as creating a statutory right which would be violated by grants such
as those in Evans. Civil No. 74-1793 at 3896.
22 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra.26 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). The chief
reason that legislative history has not been particularly helpful in resolving questions of
standing under the Civil Rights Acts is that Congress, in drafting the Acts, never directly
dealt with the issue of standing of private persons. See Comment, Standing to Challenge
Housing Discrimination: The Limits of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 URBAN L.
ANNUAL 311, 315 (1974).
27 See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3894-95, quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (1968) (remarks of
Senator Mondale) and id. at 9563 (remarks of Representative Celler). See also Comment, The
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the legislation was to reshape the policies of federal agencies which
had in the past either ignored or affirmatively encouraged dis-
crimination in housing, these remarks revealed that it was the
legislature's intent that the fair housing statutes, particularly the
Civil Rights Act of 1968,28 alleviate the plight of ghetto residents. 29
The judiciary, Judge Oakes observed, has traditionally recognized
that the 1968 Act was intended to provide a wide range of protec-
tion, and, to this end, its statutory provisions have been given a
liberal construction.30 Moreover, other circuit courts have held that
a viable claim of noncompliance with statutory duties may exist
where federal agency action results in the maintenance of existing
patterns of segregation which Congress has affirmatively ordered
agencies to eliminate.31 Hence, Judge Oakes concluded that the
plaintiffs' asserted interest was within the broad umbrella of statu-
tory protection.
Fair Housing Act: Standing for the Private Attorney General, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 562, 563-64
(1972).
28 As Judge Oakes noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be more limited in scope
than the 1968 Act, since the former contains a "pinpoint provision" limiting an agency's
power to terminate or refuse federal funding to those portions of the program in which
discrimination has been found. See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3894; note 5 supra. Since no claim
was made that the park and sewer projects involved in Evans would be operated solely for
the benefit of whites, the affirmative duty provisions of the 1964 Act may be inapplicable. See
Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1972).29 See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3895, quoting 114 CONG. REC. 9563 (1968), wherein Represen-
tative Celler stated that "[tjhe purpose or 'end' of the Federal Fair Housing Act is to remove
the walls of discrimination which enclose minority groups in ghettos .... This concern with
the housing of ghetto residents was shared by members of the Senate. See 114 CONG. REC.
2274 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale) ("[O]ur failure to abolish the ghetto will reinforce
the growing alienation of white and black America."); id. at 2281 (remarks of Senator
Brooke) ("The purpose of this bill.., is to give black Americans an opportunity to live in
decent housing in this country.").
30 The Supreme Court has described Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as "a
detailed housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable
by a complete arsenal of federal authority." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417
(1968) (dictum). Accord, Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (Fair
Housing Act of 1968 prohibits "all forms of discrimination, sophisticated as well as
simpleminded"); United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1133-34 (M.b. Fla. 1972) (Fair
Housing Act of 1968 "prohibits conduct with discriminatory consequences as well as dis-
criminatorily motivated practices"); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp.
776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (Fair Housing Act of 1968 to be given broad construction to
implement congressional policy of providing fair housing).
31 See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam),
wherein the court held that plaintiffs, including citizens and taxpayers as well as black stu-
dents, were entitled to injunctive relief ordering the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to take immediate action to end segregation in over 200 school districts which had
been receiving federal funds. According to the court, continuation of such subsidization
would be "contrary to the expressed purposes of Congress" under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1162. So too, in Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970),
the court held that residents and businessmen in the vicinity of an urban renewal project had
standing to challenge HUD action which maintained the low income character of the
neighborhood.
1975]
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The court divided not on the concept of zone of interests,32
but on the question of injury in fact. Because disbursement of the
grants in question would have no visible effect on the plaintiffs, 33
narrowly viewing the issue as an attempt to enjoin specific agency
grants would seem to mandate the conclusion that the plaintiffs
were without injury on which such a complaint could be based.
This was essentially the approach adopted by Judge Moore in his
dissent. Limiting his consideration to the question of standing for
the purpose of enjoining the specific grants to the Town of New
Castle, 34 the Judge concluded that the plaintiffs had not dem-
onstrated the requisite injury in fact upon which standing could
be based.35 As support for his conclusion, Judge Moore relied
principally on recent Supreme Court decisions which denied citi-
zens and taxpayers standing to raise constitutional questions. 36 Pre-
2 Unlike Judge Oakes, the dissent never addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs
were within the statutes' zone of interests. Professor Davis has pointed out that many lower
federal courts have ignored the Data Processing zone of interests test. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAw TEXT § 22.07 (3d ed. 1972). This appears to be the approach taken in Hodgson v.
Carpenters Local 2212, 457 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3d Cir. 1972), and Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp.
389, 392 (M.D. Fla. 1972). While a majority of the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the
zone of interests test, Justices White and Brennan would require no more than a showing of
injury in fact. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-68, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the result and dissenting). Other courts have given the test a very liberal construction,
apparently emphasizing the word "arguably." See, e.g., Constructores Civiles de Cen-
troamerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Harry H. Price & Sons v.
Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 394 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). For a
general discussion of the varying approaches courts have taken to the Data Processing test, see
Hasl, Standing Revisited - The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 12, 33 (1973).
11 The dissent assessed the monetary amount involved at $358,000 for the sewers and
$57,500 for the park. Such amounts, he noted, would "scarcely suffice for a low-cost
housing project." Civil No. 74-1793 at 3916 (Moore, J., dissenting).3 4 Judge Moore stated: "What the plaintiffs seek to achieve here would indeed '... open
the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing "government by injunction."' " Id. at 3912,
quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
31 Civil No. 74-1793 at 3910-17 (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore emphasized the
absence of any connection between the plaintiffs and either the grants or the Town ben-
efited by the grants. Specifically, plaintiffs made no claim that they were denied housing on
the basis of race, that the use of the relatively small amount of money involved would result
in diminished grants for any low income housing project, nor that the exclusionary zoning
was constitutionally infirm. Id. at 3908. Additionally, Judge Moore argued that the grants for
sewer and park facilities were not related to housing. Id. at 3916. Apparently this emphasis
on the absence of a connection with the community stems from Judge Moore's view of the
controversy as an indirect attack on the exclusionary zoning and land use policies of New
Castle. See id. at 3903.
36 Judge Moore relied upon Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974) (citizen standing), United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayer
standing), O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (citizen standing), and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (special interest group). In Richardson, a taxpayer, challenging
statutes regulating the funding of the CIA, claimed that the secrecy provisions were uncon-
stitutional. The Court dismissed the complaint, refusing to allow a federal court to be used
as a forum for " 'generalized grievances.'" 418 U.S. at 175, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83,106 (1968). In O'Shea, plaintiffs had brought a class action to enjoin allegedly unconstitu-
tional bond-setting and sentencing procedures. Holding that none of the named plaintiffs
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sumably such reliance on the part of Judge Moore indicates that he
considered the injury alleged in Evans neither concrete, nor actual,
nor personal to the plaintiffs. 37 Judge Oakes, however, adopted a
broader view of the allegations. In his opinion, plaintiffs had chal-
lenged the alleged failure of the defendant agencies to perform
statutory duties established for their benefit. The "gist" of the
complaint, therefore, was agency inaction rather than action.38
Persistent noncompliance with statutory obligations, he noted, may
result in perpetuation of existing patterns of discriminatory hous-
ing. In many instances, grants made without proper evaluation
may serve to support white enclaves as well as divert funds which
could be used to alleviate ghettoization. 39 Judge Oakes therefore
concluded that, as ghetto residents, the plaintiffs were sufficiently
aggrieved by the defendants' inaction to challenge the grants in
question.4 0
had suffered the injury specified, the Court denied them standing. In Schlesinger, the
claimants, relying on the incompatibility clause, challenged the constitutionality of allowing
Congressmen to be members of the armed forces reserves. The Supreme Court again
denied standing, finding that the plaintiffs had no personal stake in the lawsuit.
At least in Richardson, the Court's refusal to grant standing might be based in part on the
nonjusticiability of the subject matter. In fact, the majority there observed that there might
be some support for the argument that the claims presented were "committed to the
surveillance of Congress." 418 U.S. at 179. All of the cases relied upon by Judge Moore,
moreover, may be distinguished from Evans in that they involved constitutional questions.
Standing to litigate statutory claims, on the other hand, has a broader scope. See note 46 and
accompanying text infra.
Furthermore, courts are hesitant to recognize standing based on taxpayer or citizen
status believing that such claims are often mere generalized grievances which are better
channelled through the political process than through the judiciary. United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188, 192 (1974). The Court applied the concept of generalized
grievances to deny standing in Sierra Club. There, an environmental association challenged
the modernization and development of an area of great natural beauty. The Court said that
mere assertion of a "special interest," without any allegation of injury, was insufficient to
confer standing. 405 U.S. at 739. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), discussed in note 45 infra, however, the
Court granted standing to an association where only a minimal allegation of personal injury
was made. Perhaps the strong public policy in favor of conservation prompted the SCRAP
Court, having found an article III "case" or "controversy," to recognize such minimal
allegations of injury as sufficient. The strong public policy of fair housing coupled with the
minimal allegation of injury presented in Evans would similarly appear sufficient to confer
standing.
37See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3911-17.
3JId. at 3897.
39Id. at 3898.
"I1d. The views expressed by Judge Oakes in his dissenting opinion in Citizens Comm.
for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975), might profitably be compared with his policy arguments in Evans. The Faraday Wood
court refused to recognize any obligation on the part of government agencies to provide
low income housing. In his dissent, Judge Oakes stressed the importance of housing as a
"basic necessity." Id. at 1072 (Oakes, J., dissenting). He suggested that given the scarcity of
decent housing in today's cities, citizens may have a "fundamental" right to adequate
housing. Id. at 1073. In his view, "at least partial solutions to many of urban America's
problems may be found by breaking down metropolitan income-group clustering." Id.
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One probable reason for the division of the Evans panel is the
absence of any definitive statement from the Supreme Court on
what constitutes injury in fact.41 It is clear that the injury to the
claimants must be both actual and personal,42 although it need not
be economic. Aesthetic and environmental harm 43 and injury re-
sulting from the loss of the benefits derived from interracial associ-
ations44 have been held sufficient to confer standing. Indeed, gen-
eral principles have developed, and legalisms and key phrases
abound, but there seem to be no definitive rules. It appears that in
some instances, because of the importance of the subject matter or
the nature of the claim asserted, courts have granted standing to
plaintiffs who have what some consider to be merely "remote,
speculative, and insubstantial" injuries.45 Moreover, where statu-
Although limited to the issue of standing, his decision in Evans, taken together with his
dissent in Faraday Wood, indicates that Judge Oakes favors broad judicial review of adminis-
trative action in the area of fair housing.
" See Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187, 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.06 (3d ed. 1972); Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commen-
tay on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256, 258 (1971).
12 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974); Conservation Council v.
Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 1974); Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504
F.2d 156, 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1974).
4 3 E.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966).
" Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (white tenants injured
by landlord's refusal to rent to blacks); Marable v. Alabama Mental Health, Bd. 297 F. Supp.
291, 297 (M.D. Ala. 1969) ("secondary effects" on hospital patients caused by segregating
hospital staff).
45 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 723 (1973) (White, J., dissenting in part). In
SCRAP, five law students sought to enjoin ICC action allowing a rate hike for railroad
freight carriers across the nation. The students alleged that the rate boost would result in
making shipment of recycled materials too costly. "[E]conomic, recreational and aesthetic
harm," id. at 678, would then be suffered, they claimed, since their use of the forests, lakes,
and streams would be adversely affected by environmental pollution.
Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger labeled the allegations of injury
"remote, speculative, and insubstantial." Id. at 723. Recognizing that they were being asked
to follow a "far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury," id. at 688, a
majority of the Court nevertheless held that the allegations satisfied the jurisdictional re-
quirement of injury in fact and expressly refused to limit standing to those persons "sig-
nificantly" affected by agency action. Id. at 689 n.14. In explaining that small injury might be
sufficient where important rights are at stake, the Court noted that it had previously
"allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the
outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, . . . a $5 fine and costs .... and a $1.50 poll
tax." Id. (citations omitted).
In consumer suits, voting rights cases, and first amendment actions, intangible harm and
minimal allegations of injury have been deemed sufficient for standing purposes. In En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court held
that membership associations with an "organizational interest in the problem" have standing
as representatives of consumers of regulated products to challenge the application of regula-
tions intended to protect the public safety. Id. at 1097. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the Court recognized that plaintiffs whose individual interests amounted to no more than a
fraction of a vote had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome. While Judge Moore is
correct in stating that the monetary amount involved in Evans would not finance a small
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM
tory construction, rather than an abstract constitutional question, is
concerned, courts have been less reluctant to enlarge the categories
of those persons who have standing to sue. 46
Although the standing doctrine originates in the Constitution,
which limits judicial review to "cases and controversies,' '4 7 it is,
practically speaking, largely a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint
utilized to conserve court resources in the face of voluminous
litigation. 8 Viewed as a prudential device, the doctrine of standing
appears to restrict in no way a court's opinion to expand, within
constitutional limits, the range of persons permitted to prosecute
actions in areas of important public interest. 49 The Supreme Court
has noted that in order to effectuate the purposes of the fair
housing provisions "the main generating force must be private
suits." 50 As the Third Circuit has recognized, where the claimant
presents a genuine case or controversy, "overly technical judicial
doctrines of standing" should not be permitted to frustrate the
national policy embodied in civil rights legislation. 5' The further-
ance of this national policy requires that standing under these
statutes be broadly construed.52
The cases relied upon by Judge Moore in reaching his conclu-
sion that plaintiffs will suffer no injury in fact concerned, for the
housing project, it is also obvious that a fraction of a vote will not determine the outcome of
an election. Indeed, a mere "chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights has
been recognized as a basis for standing. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1975).
46See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970), where the Court noted: "Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlarge-
ment of the class of people who may protest administrative action."
47 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
48 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
49 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975). In Warth the Court stated that standing
"essentially [involves] matters of judicial self-governance." Id. at 500. There the Court chose
not to exercise its discretion to expand the scope of standing to include certain residents of
Rochester who, as "potential residents" of the suburb of Pennfield, directly attacked the
Town's exclusionary zoning laws. Although Judge Moore deemed the action in Evans to be
an indirect attack on New Castle's zoning laws, see text accompanying note 66 infra. Warth
should not be controlling. Evans is not a zoning case and a favorable decision for the
plaintiffs will not affect the Town's zoning laws.
50Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
51 Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971). Hackett brought suit
against his employer claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e el seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp IV, 1974), which prohibits discriminatory
employment practices. The plaintiff's status as an "employee" within the meaning of the Act
was challenged on the ground that he had already left the job and was receiving a pension.
The court rejected this argument, stating that the statute's remedies provision, permitting
suit by "'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a congressional intention to define
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution." 445 F.2d at 446.
52 Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See also
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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most part, delicate constitutional questions raised at the behest of
taxpayers or citizens.5 3 Where the issues involve fair housing, an
area high on the list of priorities of a number of members of
Congress,54 courts should be more reticent to close their doors to
plaintiffs who have a personal interest and are ready to present a
vigorous adjudication of the issues.
Judge Moore also expressed serious concern over the court's
expanding power of review over administrative action. In his opin-
ion, the Evans litigation largely involved the extent to which the
judiciary may override discretionary decisions by the executive
branch of government. 5 He cautioned that a favorable decision for
the plaintiffs could result in "the establishment of a principle that
the judgment and discretion exercised by the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government can be examined and questioned ...
by any citizen .... 56
Considering the limited holding of the Second Circuit in
Evans, Judge Moore's fears appear to be somewhat premature. It is
suggested that Judge Oakes' holding is limited to the issue of
plaintiffs' standing to question whether the agencies had made the
inquiries allegedly required by statute.5 7 No opinion as to the
ultimate reviewability of the agency's final determination was ex-
pressed. In fact, Judge Gurfein, in a concurring opinion, presented
such a view of the court's holding: that the plaintiffs were
sufficiently aggrieved by agency action "to raise the question of
whether the Secretary has failed to make the inquiries implied
from his affirmative duty .... ,"58 He would not, however, go so far
as to say that the plaintiffs were injured enough to seek to enjoin
the agency grants. In this way, Judge Gurfein sidestepped, for
now, a determination as to whether the grants in question could be
enjoined by the plaintiffs, thus avoiding confrontation with Judge
'3 See note 36 supra.
" See 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968), where Senator Mondale noted that "fair housing
legislation is a basic keystone to any solution of our present urban crisis." The remarks by
Senator Mondale reflect recognition of a direct relationship between housing, on the one
hand, and employment and educational opportunities, on the other. See id. So too, Senator
Brooke called fair housing "one of the most urgent matters of our day," id. at 2279, and
considered this issue the "first priority" in dealing with the urban crisis. Id.
51 Civil No. 74-1793 at 3901 (Moore, J., dissenting).
-5 Id. at 3909. Judge Moore's argument is partly based on the reluctance exhibited by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), discussed in note 36
supra, to allow confrontations between the representative or elected and the nonrepresenta-
tive or nonelected branches of government. Whether in fact HUD and BOR may have the
benefit of such a policy might be disputed. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 939-40.
"See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3898.
"Id. at 3918 (Gurfein, J., concurring and dissenting).
[Vol. 50:303
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM
Moore's spectre of judicial "Big Brother" running roughshod over
the executive branch. He further noted, however, that when Con-
gress has provided that "federal funds shall not be used if certain
conditions exist, the courts are often not without jurisdiction to
review." 59
Judge Moore's worry that the decision of the Evans court
portends the unwarranted expansion of judicial power is rather
surprising in view of the Supreme Court's presumption that agency
action is reviewable by the courts. 60 Furthermore, although some
decisions by the Secretary of HUD may be committed to agency
discretion and therefore subject to limited judicial review, a deci-
sion to disregard a clear congressional mandate to effectuate a
national policy through the administration of agency programs
would neither be within the agency's discretion nor immune from
judicial reversal.61 It is submitted that there are strong policy
reasons for this approach. There is increasing concern over the
tendency of agencies to shield the very organizations they are
designed to regulate, rather than safeguard the interests they are
designed to protect.6 2 The inertia which often characterizes
bureaucratic administrative agencies and their failure to respond to
external pressures may make broader judicial review a desirable
goal, particularly where the legislature has specifically prescribed
the policy to be followed. In a system where the maintenance of
checks and balances among the three branches is fundamental to
the proper functioning of government, some would welcome
rather than shun an active judiciary "peering over the shoulders"
of the executive branch. 63 Perhaps in recognition of these factors,
courts have been willing to broaden standing when agency action is
questioned.64 Administrative agencies should not be immunized
9 Id. at 3921. Accord, Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809,
819-20 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (Fair Housing Act of 1949).
6OSee Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
6 See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3920. In response to a question concerning the recourse of
"persons who disagree with [HUD's] interpretation of the Act," Senator Mondale, one of the
chief sponsors of the Fair Housing Act, noted: "All orders of the Department will be subject
to review by the Federal courts. In addition the Department will be subject to the provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act in all its operations under the Fair Housing Act." 114
CONG. REc. 2273 (1968).62 See Tucker, supra note 3, at 921.
0 Id. at 939-40.
64 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968) ("no explicit statutory provision is
necessary to confer standing"); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (abandonment of invasion of a "legal right" as prerequisite for stand-
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from the challenges of other governmental branches merely to
avoid the potential threat of "Big Brother. 65
Judge Moore saw this action as an attempt to provide govern-
ment by injunction and as an indirect attack on the zoning policies
of one town by the residents of another. 66 Judge Oakes, on the
other hand, restricted his consideration to the question of standing
based upon the allegations of the complaint and the district court's
limited findings of fact. 67 In deciding the narrow issue of standing,
it is suggested that the latter is the better approach. Whereas Judge
Moore's considerations extend beyond the question of standing to
inquiries involving the merits, 68 the focus in standing questions is
on who the plaintiffs are, not what they seek to challenge. 69 The
Evans court passed no judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs'
claim. The court did not decide whether the defendants met their
duties under the Civil Rights Acts or even what those duties entail.
For purposes of standing, a court need only be satisfied that plain-
tiffs present a "viable" claim that their asserted interests are within
the purview of the statute and threatened by the challenged action.
The holding of the Evans court, while perhaps at the outer
limit of the standing perimeter, is supported by the strong national
policy underlying the Civil Rights Acts and the traditionally broad
interpretation7 0 given the term "person aggrieved,' ' 7 which ap-
pears in the remedial provisions of these Acts. Since judicial review
of agency action is the rule rather than the exception, granting
standing to the plaintiffs in Evans will not threaten the unique roles
of the judiciary and executive branches of government. Further-
more, since standing requirements are often self-imposed measures
utilized to further judicial economy, they are thought to be flexible
enough to give way in areas where courts find it necessary to
protect important public interests. It is suggested that fair housing
ing); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1970) (standing
question "easily answered" since no statutory prohibition against review).
65 Tucker, supra note 3, at 940.
"6See Civil No. 74-1793 at 3912, 3903.
:'See id. at 3889, 3897.
8 In voicing his dissent, Judge Moore, approaching the issue "in terms of the plaintiffs'
objectives," Civil No. 74-1793 at 3908 (Moore, J., dissenting), characterized the suit as an
"oblique coercive proceeding" to secure more low income housing throughout the nation. Id.
at 3909. More specifically, he viewed the plaintiffs' complaint as an indirect attack on New
Castle's housing and zoning policies. Id. at 3903. Concerned with what he envisioned as "the
result of success for plaintiffs in this litigation," i.e. termination of the New Castle grants, the
Judge concluded that the court should not entertain their suit. Id. at 3909.
69 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).70 See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972); note 51
supra.
1 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
[Vol. 50:303
1975] SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM 315
is one such area where judicial economy should give way to the
public interest. By assuming whatever increased burden results
from the Evans decision, courts can provide an additional but much
needed forum for promoting the policy of the Civil Rights Acts.
Timothy Donovan
